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“All-Possible-Worlds” is a novel interpretation of quantum physics, which results from a unified
reformulation of Many-Worlds and Copenhagen (“collapse”) in the light of quantum contextuality,
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single qubit and qutrit experiments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Fifty years ago, Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker
proved that quantum theory cannot be explained with
noncontextual models.[...]In the last decade, the Kochen-
Specker theorem has inspired some results which help us
to understand quantum theory and [...] the power of
quantum systems for information processing and compu-
tation.” [1, 2].
At the same time, Specker’s “theological motivation”
behind the theorem has received little attention. Specker
was an inspired theologian seriously engaged in interpret-
ing Scripture, as his insightful sermons in Zu¨rich’s Evan-
gelische Hoschschulgemeinde and Predigerkirche show
[3]. One of the theological questions he worried about
is that of divine omniscience. In his seminal article
“Die Logik nicht gleichzeitig entscheindbarer Aussagen”
in 1960 Specker brings this question in relation with
quantum contextuality [4]:
“In a certain sense the scholastic speculations about the “Infu-
turabilien” [this term invented by Specker is to be translated as
something like‘future contingencies’] also belong here,that is, the
question whether the omniscience of God also extends to events
that would have occurred in case something would have happened
that did not happen. (cf. e.g. [3], Vol. 3, p. 363.)”
In this quotation Reference [3] is the book by M.
Solana, Historia de la filosof´ıa espan˜ola (Asociacion
Espan˜ola para el Progreso de las Ciencias, Madrid 1941),
where in “p. 363” is presented the philosophical view
of the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro de Fonseca. And the
“scholastic speculations” Specker refers to is the contro-
versy raised by the theory of Luis de Molina (disciple of
Fonseca) about the compatibility of “Divine omniscience
and human free-will”.
In this article I argue that the question of “Infutura-
bilien” referred to by Specker in [4] may help us to better
understand the relationship between quantum contextu-
ality and nonlocality. Specifically, “infuturabilien” allow
us to reformulate “Many-Worlds” as a theory of “All-
Possible-Worlds”, which do exist in the divine mind [5]:
By making a choice to perform a measurement the ex-
perimenter realizes one of these possible worlds, instead
of provoking the split of the actual world (and the exper-
imenter her/himself) into many unconnected worlds, as
Many-Worlds claims.
In this sense All-Possible-Worlds makes it possible to
unify two interpretations of quantum physics considered
opposite so far: Conpenhagen and Many-Worlds, and
proposes “nonlocality at detection” as a principle rul-
ing the whole quantum realm, including single qubit and
qutrit experiments. In the same line of thinking it ac-
counts for divine omniscience without abolishing human
free-will, and thereby contributes to solve the outstand-
ing “Infuturabilien” problem.
Additionally, All-Possible-Worlds has a number of in-
teresting consequences for physics: The number of possi-
ble worlds in the divine mind is the same as the maximal
number of free choices the humans of all times can in
principle perform. If one acknowledges the theological
theorem that this number is finite, and asks for phys-
ical features granting this, one is naturally lead to: 1)
discreetness of space-time, 2) upper bounded signaling,
and 3) the heat death of the universe (“time arrow” and
“second law” of thermodynamics).
All this means that what is and is not possible is not
determined by physical “laws” but the other way around,
it is these “laws” which actually arise from what is and
is not possible. All-Possible-Worlds bring to focus an
overlooked feature of Many-Worlds: At the end of the
day physical reality is defined by the free choices human
observers can perform.
In summary, reformulating Many-Worlds in the light of
Quantum Contextuality allow us to appreciate the aston-
ishing potential of quantum physics for interpreting con-
sistently the physical world without giving up free-will,
stimulating interdisciplinary research, and contributing
even to philosophical and theological knowledge, the kind
of work Ernst Specker did. Paraphrasing Alexei Grin-
baum: “By linking the mathematical properties of [the
quantum] with other episodes in the history of ideas, one
gives quantum theory and quantum technologies a place
in history and a place in culture.” [6]
ar
X
iv
:1
71
2.
06
44
8v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
4 M
ar 
20
19
2II. THE “ASSYRIAN PROPHET” PARABLE
Specker liked to introduce quantum contextuality in a
narrative way by using the following parable he invented
[4]:
“During the age of king Asarhaddon a wise man from Ninive
taught at the school of prophets in Araba’ilu. He was an out-
standing representative of his discipline (solar and lunar eclipses)
who was, except for the heavenly bodies, concerned almost exclu-
sively about his daughter. His teaching success was modest, the
discipline was proved to be dry and required also previous math-
ematical knowledge, which was scarcely present. Although he did
not find the interest amongst the students that he had hoped for,
it was however given to him in abundance in a different field. No
sooner had his daughter reached the marriageable age, than he was
bombarded with marriage proposals to her by students and young
graduates. And although he did not believe that he could keep
her to himself forever, she was in any case still far too young and
her suitors were also in no way worthy of her. And in order for
each of them to convince themselves that they were unworthy, he
promised them that she would be the wife of he who would solve a
prediction-task that was posed to them.”
The prediction-task is represented in Fig.1. Specker
arranged a happy-end to the story as follows [4]:
The daughter would have remained unmarried until the father’s
death, if she would not have swiftly opened two boxes herself after
the prediction of the son of a prophet, who indicated that precisely
one should be filled and the other empty, which turned out to be
actually the case. At the weak objection by the father that he would
have opened two other boxes, she attempted to open the third box,
which turned out to be impossible, after which the father declared
in a mumbling way the not-falsified prediction as valid.
The assumption that the result of having 1 or 0 at the
opening one of the three boxes, say A, is predetermined
before opening this box, and therefore independent of
wether one opens A together with B or together with C,
corresponds to the assumption in classical physics. This
assumption leads to the prediction that the probability
to get the same result in each box is P (x, y|x = y) =
1/3 whichever pair of boxes is opened, and whether the
prophet uses two diamonds or only one.
By contrast the prediction that if one opens any of the
three possible pairs of boxes one always gets the result 1
for one box and 0 for the other, would be analogous to the
quantum mechanical one. In other words the probability
to get the same result in each box is P (x, y|x = y) = 0
whichever pair is opened.
It has been shown that Specker’s parable offers a narra-
tive thread that weaves together a large number of results
regarding quantum contextuality, nonlocality, and com-
plementarity [7]. The parable proves highly appropriate
for the sake of this paper as well, in particular to clarify
the relationship between contextuality and nonlocality.
This quantum “contextual magic” in the parable can
be interpreted in three main different ways: Superdeter-
minism, Collapse, Many-Worlds.
FIG. 1: Quantum Contextuality: In Ernst Specker’s para-
ble (see text) the suitors were led in front of a table on which
three boxes were positioned in a row, and they were ordered to
indicate which of the boxes contained a gem and which were
empty. And now no matter how many times they tried, it
seemed to be impossible to solve the task. After their predic-
tions, each of the suitors was ordered to open two boxes which
they had indicated to be both empty or both not empty: it
turned out each time that one contained a gem and the other
did not, and, to be precise, sometimes the gem was in the first,
sometimes in the second of the boxes that were opened.[4]
III. SUPERDETERMINISM
The prophet knows which pair of boxes the suitor will
choose, for instance B and C, and prepares the setting
with a diamond in only one of these two boxes so that ei-
ther result 10 or 01 appears. This interpretation amounts
to deny human free will.
In the context of the discussion about “Infuturabilien”
(divine omniscience and human free will) Superdetermin-
ism would correspond to the solution that God knows
which choice we will make, together with its outcome,
before we do it.
IV. COPENHAGEN
The outcome results become determined at the mo-
ment of measurement (opening of two boxes and observ-
ing whether each of them contains a diamond or not).
There is the freedom on the part of the experimenter to
choose the settings of the apparatus (one of the three
possible pairs of boxes) and there is the freedom on the
part of nature in choosing the outcome results (either 10
or 01) for each single event i.e: each suitor’s choice. The
fact that each measurement realizes only one of several
possible results described by the “wave function” is usu-
ally referred to as the “collapse of the wave function”.
Nonetheless this term conflates two different things:
a) The decision about which of the possible results be-
comes realized.
3b) The fact that this results becomes “irreversibly
recorded” and can be observed.
According to the orthodox view the moment of “detec-
tion” is crucial.
The assumption that a) (the decision of the outcome)
happens at detection implies “nonlocal” coordination be-
tween detection events. As it is well known, Einstein ar-
gued against this “nonlocality” as early as 1927 [20]. The
quantum collapse, he claimed, implies coordination of the
detectors, which cannot be explained by influences prop-
agating with velocity v ≤ c; this involves “an entirely
peculiar mechanism of action at a distance, which [...]
implies to my mind a contradiction with the postulate of
relativity.” [20].
We will discuss quantum nonlocality more in detail
later in Section VII. Here it is suitable to remember
what experiments in the last three decades have demon-
strated and Specker’s parable also illustrates (see Fig.4):
Quantum correlations cannot be interpreted in the sense
that one event occurs first and is the cause of the other,
but one should rather state that correlated events arise
like a single event coming from outside space-time; the
prophet’s assignment of outcomes does not involve any
time order and so can be considered covariant. Actu-
ally both, quantum nonlocal and local relativistic correla-
tions, assume “free will” and happen without connection
in space-time.[43]
The fact that at “detection” something “irreversible”
happens (assumption b) above) has been emphasized
by John A. Wheeler’s: “No elementary quantum phe-
nomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (‘ob-
served’, ‘indelibly recorded’) phenomenon, ‘brought to a
close’ by ‘an irreversible act of amplification’.” [8]. “Ir-
reversibility” is the core of the so called “measurement
problem” and has the noteworthy implication that we
cannot apply quantum mechanical description to visible
objects: The two detectors watching the output ports of
a Mach-Zehnder interferometer can be considered “non-
locally” coordinated (see Section VII hereafter), but one
detector cannot be considered as being in superposition
of two distant locations. Niels Bohr himself postulated
the “necessity of discriminating in each experimental ar-
rangement between those parts of the physical system
considered which are to be treated as measuring instru-
ments and those which constitute the objects under in-
vestigation” and referred to this necessity as “a princi-
pal distinction between classical and quantum mechani-
cal description of physical phenomena” (italics by Bohr)
[9]. Admittedly, Bohr seems to weaken this distinction
by stating that: “It is true that the place within each
measuring device where this discrimination is made is in
both cases [classical and quantum] largely a matter of
conveience.” But he insists that in quantum theory the
distinction is of “fundamental importance”: The measur-
ing device has to be classical even if the classical theories
do not suffice in accounting for the new types of quan-
tum regularities.[9] So, Bohr seems to suggest that there
are definite conditions defining when a result appears and
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FIG. 2: Many-Worlds: (a) At the opening of the boxes
AB the world splits in four worlds. In each of these one of
the four possible results becomes realized and observed by a
corresponding suitor. (b) Many-Worlds completed with all
possible choices.
can be observed, even if for the time being we don’t know
which these conditions are.
This means that Erwin Schro¨dinger with his famous
“cat paradox” has in fact popularized a confused inter-
pretation of quantum theory. Defining “standard quan-
tum theory” as a theory “which does not impose any
constraints on the complexity of objects it is applied to”,
or assuming that “an agent A can apply the rule to ar-
bitrary systems S around her, including large ones that
may contain other agents [system S can even be the en-
tire lab]”(as assumption (Q) in [11] states) seems unfit-
ting. “Standard quantum theory” -at least in Wheeler’s
understanding- imposes constraints on the complexity of
objects it is applied, as soon as this complexity becomes
equal as or larger than that involved in a detection: If a
system collapses, it collapses for all observers.
However [11] has the merit of showing that any theory
accepting both, Born’s rule and description of “macro-
scopic” objects (like experimenters) in terms of quantum
superposition, is not consistent. This result is relevant
for our discussion later in Section XIII.
V. MANY-WORLDS
This interpretation (represented in Fig.2a) goes back
to the relative state formulation of Quantum Mechanics
proposed by Hugh Everett 1957 [14]. “The fundamental
4idea of the MWI [...] is that there are myriads of worlds
in the Universe in addition to the world we are aware
of. In particular, every time a quantum experiment with
different possible outcomes is performed, all outcomes are
obtained, each in a different world, even if we are only
aware of the world with the outcome we have seen.”[12].
At any choice the world splits in 4 parallel worlds, so
that all possible outcomes become realized although in
different parallel worlds and is seen in each world by a
corresponding observer (“suitor”), as represented in Fig.
2(a) for choice AB. The parallel worlds and suitors result-
ing at each experiment are in principle “experimentally”
inaccessible to each other.
Many-Worlds has been formulated in various ways.
David Deutsch uses the “Multiverse” formulation to ex-
plain the notion of a “quantum computer” [13], which
contains only possible outcomes predicted by quantum
mechanics: In the case of Fig. 2(a) the “Multiverse”
consists in only two universes represented by the first
two colones.
The meaning of Many-Worlds is particularly well
brought to light in the formulation “Parallel lives” by
Gilles Brassard and Paul Raymond-Robichaud [15]. Ac-
cording to this version: “When Alice pushes a button on
her box, she splits in two, together with her box. One
Alice A sees the red light flash on her box, whereas the
other A* sees the green light flash. Both Alices, A and
A*, are equally real. However, they are now living par-
allel lives: they will never be able to see each other or
interact with each other. In fact, neither Alice is aware
of the existence of the other, unless they infer it by pure
thought as the only reasonable explanation for what they
will experience when they test their boxes.” [16]
Variants and extensions of Many-Worlds are properly
characterized by Frauchiger-Renner’s statement: “Their
common feature is that they do not postulate a physical
mechanism that singles out one particular measurement
outcome, although observers have the perception of single
outcomes.” ([11], v1) This characterization points also to
what may be a main inconsistency of Many-Worlds:
Indeed, according to Leibniz’s principle, “if there is
no possible perceptible difference between two objects,
then these objects are the same, not superficially, but
fundamentally” [17]. As far as one keeps to this prin-
ciple, if Alice in our world can never be able to see the
other Alice*, then one should conclude that Alice* has
no physical reality at all: Things that cannot in principle
be perceived by the senses do not exist within space-time.
And if the existence of Alice* can be inferred by reason-
ing but cannot in principle be perceived by the senses,
this means that Alice* exists outside space-time.
But one could object: Wouldn’t the latter statement
imply that events that happened in the distant past,
about which we just read in history books, but which
we cannot (and could not) perceive with our senses, do
not exist?
We access such events through observations we per-
form today: archaeological vestiges or writings docu-
All-Possible-Worlds: 
Many-Worlds & Quantum (nonlocal) Contextuality 
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FIG. 3: All-Possible-Worlds: The “prophet” has in his
mind an outcome choice for each of the three possible choices
a candidate can do. Each suitor is free to make his choice
as he wants. The prophet let then appear either the result
10 or 01. The sky-blue boxes represent the history of choices
and outcomes of Suitor N, who was allowed to make 8 choices
at different times. Other suitors would have different histo-
ries. For any choice the prophet’s assignment is nonlocal, as
illustrated in Fig.4.
menting them (see British museum). So these events
happened in our space-time. A past event that is in prin-
ciple inaccessible to observations we can perform today
does not belong to the physical reality we can describe.
The Alice* in the “parallel-lives” interpretation is
something we cannot access through any observation in
our world but only through reasoning. Accordingly, Al-
ice* lives outside our space-time, and invoking Specker’s
parable she can be considered existing in “God’s mind”,
as I propose in the following Section VI with All-Possible-
Worlds.
In summary, “Copenhagen” and “parallel lives” are
basically equivalent: Both interpretations imply that the
“physical reality” we live in is more than what we can
access with our senses.
VI. ALL-POSSIBLE-WORLDS
Many-Worlds to be consistent should also consider the
possible choices the experimenter can do. In the context
of the parable this would mean that if the suitor makes
choice AB, parallel worlds arise where “clones” of the
suitor make choice BC, respectively AC, as represented in
Fig.2(b). Paraphrasing Nicolas Gisin one could say that
in Many-Worlds the experimenter should not be merely
a passive observer, but play an active role [18].
Accordingly each single choice of a box pair would lead
5to 12 parallel worlds.
But then one could as well think of a “razored” ver-
sion keeping only the parallel worlds corresponding to the
different choices experimenters can do as represented in
Fig.2(b), and renounce to the splitting for performing all
possible outcomes as represented in Fig.2(a).
This completed version of Many-Worlds leads straight-
forwardly to our proposal of “All-Possible-Worlds”: In
the context of Specker’s parable the “prophet” has in his
mind a well-defined outcome choice for each of the three
possible choices a particular suitor can make, as repre-
sented in Fig.3. And for many rounds of a same experi-
ment (say AB) the outcomes (either 10 or 01) the suitor
would observe are distributed according to the quantum
mechanical predictions (“the Born rule”). Suppose each
candidate is allowed to make different choices at different
times: In Fig.3 is represented the history of choices and
outcomes corresponding to Suitor N. Nonetheless, one
can think that the results the prophet assigns to these
choices may depend on other circumstances: so for in-
stance if instead of Suitor N a different Suitor N’ had
made the choices, the results N’ would have obtained are
not necessarily the same as those Suitor N obtains, al-
though they may have been also distributed according to
Born rule. In this sense we do not postulate a physical
mechanism that singles out one particular measurement
outcome. However once measurement “irreversibly” hap-
pens, then the outcome becomes registered and can be ac-
cessed by any observer (however “irreversibly” may have
“exceptions”, which are discussed more in detail later in
Sections X and XIII).
According to “All-Possible-Worlds” the decision of the
outcome (the “collapse”, understood as a) in Section IV
previously) occurs in the prophet’s mind (when he as-
signs an outcome to a determined measurement), and
the opening of a box-pair (the apparatus) reveals the re-
sult the prophet assigns. Nonetheless, since we cannot
in principle access the prophet’s mind the decision can
be said to occur at detection “for all practical purposes”,
but it cannot properly be said that detection “singles
out” the outcome.
“All-Possible-Worlds” illustrates well what quantum
contextuality means: The prophet assigns results to each
possible choice and each possible round, however the as-
signment is not done for each single box but to each possi-
ble pair of boxes jointly. Consequently for each round the
assignment for A depends on whether A is “measured”
together with B (experiment AB), or with C (experiment
AC).
This interpretation has a remarkable number of impli-
cations we discuss in the following.
VII. QUANTUM NONLOCALITY AND
CONTEXTUALITY
Bell inequalities establish a limit to the degree of cor-
relation originating from a cause in the common past
FIG. 4: Contextuality and Nonlocality: (a) the opening
of the boxes are space-like separated events. (b) The opening
of the boxes are time-like separated events: Contextual cor-
relations can be simulated by a classical machine sending a
signal from B to A, propagating in space-time at v ≤ c.
cone of the correlated events. Consequently correlations
between space-like separated events that violate Bell in-
equalities cannot be explained by local-relativistic influ-
ences propagating at velocity v ≤ c. This fact is referred
to as Bell nonlocality and is characteristic for entangle-
ment experiments.
This also means that in such experiments one cannot
assign a result for Alice’s measurement independently of
Bob’s measurement. In this sense it holds that:
Bell nonlocality =⇒ Contextuality (1)
On the other hand contextuality appears in experi-
ments with single particles of spin ≥ 1, where no Bell
inequalities can be defined, and therefore it holds also
that one can have contextuality without Bell nonlocal-
ity:
Contextuality 6=⇒ Bell nonlocality (2)
Conversely, Bell locality means fulfillment of Bell in-
equalities and therefore is a feature applying to entangle-
ment experiments with 2 or more particles corresponding
to Hilbert spaces of d ≥ 4, d non prime, while locality
refers to the fact that correlations can be explained by
influences propagating at velocity v ≤ c and may happen
in any quantum experiment.
Since non-contextuality means that the measurements
Alice performs are independent of those Bob performs it
is obvious that:
Non-contextuality =⇒ Locality (3)
6Assumption of non-contextuality leads to non-
contextual inequalities, and accordingly, contextuality is
supposed to be demonstrated by results violating such
inequalities in single qutrit experiments.[28, 31, 32]
If one restricts the meaning of “nonlocality” to “vio-
lation of Bell inequalities” in entanglement experiments
with two or more particles (systems corresponding to
Hilbert space of d ≥ 4, d non prime), then one is tempted
to conclude also that quantum contextuality may be a
better feature than “nonlocality” for distinguishing quan-
tum from classical, because contextuality applies to all
quantum experiments excepted single qubits (systems
corresponding to Hilbert space of d ≥ 3).
However Specker’s parable has the merit to show that
such a generalization is misleading. In fact the boxes
can be placed at a distance from each other so that the
openings of the boxes are time-like separated events as
sketched in Fig.4(b), then contextual correlations could
be simulated by a classical mechanism, that is, by causal
relativistic connections between the boxes propagating
with v ≤ c) or information contained within space-time.
Thus contextual results (i.e.: experimental violation of
non-contextual inequalities) for them alone cannot rule
out all classical features, but only if they appear when the
openings are space-like separated as sketched in Fig.4(a).
In other words in single qutrit experiments it holds that:
Violation of non-contextual inequalities (4)
∧ Space-like separated detection events
=⇒ Non-classicality = Quantum
very much the same way as in entanglement experiments
with 2 qubits it holds that:
Violation of Bell inequalities (5)
∧ Space-like separated detection events
=⇒ Non-classicality = Quantum
A. Nonlocality at detection
To understand the relationship between contextuality
and nonlocality one should keep in mind (see Section IV)
that according to standard quantum mechanics the deci-
sion of the outcome happens at the moment of detection
(“wavefunction collapse”).
The reason for this assumption are interference exper-
iments with single particles as for instance those using
a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two output ports
monitored by corresponding detectors D0 and D1: If the
outcome (i.e.: which of the two detectors counts) were de-
termined before detection by the path the particle trav-
els, then half of the time D0 should count and half of the
time D1, and the interference pattern would disappear.
As referred to in Section IV, at the 5th Solvay confer-
ence (1927) Einstein objected to the assumption of “deci-
sion at detection” by means of a single-particle gedanken-
experiment [20]. Astonishingly Einstein’s gedanken-
experiment in 1927 has been first realized using today’s
techniques in 2012 [21]. In this experiment single pho-
tons impinge into a beam-spitter BS and thereafter get
detected. The two detectors A and B monitoring the
output ports of BS are located so that the decision “to
count” or “not to count” at A is space-like separated
and therefore locally independent from the decision “to
count” or “not to count” at B.
The experiment tests and rules out the assumption
that this correlation can be explained by some sort of lo-
cal coordination through signals with v ≤ c: Even if the
measurement of P1 is locally independent of the measure-
ment of P2, both measurements yield correlated results.
On the other hand this nonlocal coordination cannot be
used to signal faster than light from one detector to the
other. The experiment also highlights something Ein-
stein did not mention: Nonlocality is necessary to pre-
serve such a fundamental principle as energy conservation
[21].
Using the standard formalism the experiment in [21] is
described as follows: The two output ports define a basis
of orthogonal unitary vectors |v1〉 and |v2〉 in a Hilbert
space with d = 2. A count in detector A (respectively
no count in A) means a measurement that projects the
quantum state into the unitary vector |v1〉 yielding re-
sult 1 (respectively result 0), and similarly for detector
B and unitary vector |v2〉). The two measurements are
associated to the projection operators: P1 = |v1〉〈v1| and
P2 = |v2〉〈v2|, each of them with eigenvalues 1 and 0.
Since P1 and P2 commute both can have definite values,
and the measurements of these operators are said to be
compatible. Additionally, if the two orthogonal projectors
are measured on the same system they yield correlated
results: one of the two measurements must give result
1 and the other result 0. This can be considered the
simplest form of “exclusivity” as referred to in [26].
This result has also the following deeper meaning: The
two detectors A and B should be considered as a single
measuring apparatus and the jointly result of the cor-
responding detection events should be considered as a
single measurement result even when these events are
space-like separated. The result is not for instance: “de-
tector A counts”, but rather: “detector A counts and
detector B doesn’t count”.
The 5th Solvay Conference was attended also by Louis
de Broglie. He presented an interpretation different
from the Copenhagen one, the so called “pilot-wave” or
“empty-wave” picture: The particle always follows a well
determined path from the source to a detector, but there
is an undetectable “pilot-wave” that travels by the alter-
native paths, joins the particle at the arrival and, taking
account of the path-length difference, guides the particle
to one or other of the detectors to producing the char-
acteristic interference fringes predicted by Quantum Me-
7chanics.
Unfortunately, in the context of the single-particle
gedanken-experiment Einstein presented at the Confer-
ence, de Broglies “empty wave” can easily be misunder-
stood as sort of (energyless) ghost-wave carrying only
information but travelling at the same speed of the mate-
rial particle, so that you can explain interference avoiding
nonlocal coordination. Indeed, Einstein misinterpreted
this way de Broglies idea and praised it as going in “the
right direction”.[20]
The debate resumed in 1935 with the famous EPR
paper, where Einstein proposed a new thought experi-
ment with two particles, that is, an entanglement exper-
iment. Some years later (1952) David Bohm published
an article [22] applying de Broglies picture to explain
the EPR experiment. In this context it became clear
that the “empty-wave” has nothing to do with a “ghost-
wave” propagating locally within the ordinary 3-space,
but is rather a mathematical entity defined in the so
called “3N-space or configuration space”([23] p. 128). In
other words, the “wave” guides the material particle from
outside the ordinary space-time (nonlocally) to produce
space-like separated correlated detections at the two sides
of the setup. This is the origin of the Bohmian picture,
which inspired John Bell to find a criterion allowing to de-
cide between quantum non-locality and Einsteins locality
by means of entanglement experiments: The meanwhile
famous Bell inequalities [23]. Since 1982 a number of
well-known experiments have ruled out Einsteins locality
upholding the quantum mechanical predictions.
The important lesson of the story is that the “de
Broglie-Bohm” interpretation is itself nonlocal, although
it can be misunderstood as local in single-particle ex-
periments. The only difference with relation to Copen-
hagen is, that in this picture the “wave-function” influ-
ences macroscopic material objects like detectors, and
can be interpreted as inducing nonlocal coordination be-
tween detection events, and in the “de Broglie-Bohm”
picture the “wave-function” influences microscopic mate-
rial particles, and can be interpreted as inducing nonlocal
coordination between choices at the beam-splitters.
The conclusions from the space-like single qubit experi-
ment can be straightforwardly extended to a qutrit exper-
iment using particles of spin 1 crossing a Stern-Gerlach
non-homogeneous magnetic field (i.e: experiments like
those invoked in the Kochen&Specker theorem[2]). Sup-
pose each of the three output ports is monitored by a cor-
responding detector D0, D1 and D2. We denote the cor-
responding three basis states as |v0〉, |v1〉, |v2〉. The three
projectors: P0 = |v0〉〈v0|, P1 = |v1〉〈v1|, P2 = |v2〉〈v2|
are orthogonal and commute pairwise, and therefore also
according to QM they can have jointly sharp defined val-
ues. Additionally, the three orthogonal projectors P0,
P1, P2 yield correlated results: One of the three mea-
surements must give result 1 (count) and the other two
result 0 (no-count); this property is referred to as “exclu-
sivity principle” in contextuality [26]. Suppose now the
three detectors are set in such a way that the detection
FIG. 5: Proof of K&S with 18 rays, according to [24]:
One arranges 18 unitary vectors in 9 different bases of 4 pair-
wise orthogonal unitary vectors vi,j , i ∈ {1, 4}, j ∈ {1, 9},
so that each vector appears in two different basis (boxes
denoted by same letter and color). Projection operators
Pij = |vij〉〈vij | onto each of the 18 unitary vectors yield ei-
ther value 1 or 0, indicated in the top right corner of each
box. Since each Pij appears repeated in two different bases
one has: P19 = P33, P29 = P34, P39 = P47, P49 = P28. This
means: either each Pi9 = 0 and then
∑4
i=1 Pi9 = 0, or one
of the four Pi9 yields value 1, say P39 = 1, and then P47 = 1
with
∑4
i=1 Pi7 = 2. In any case one is led to a contradiction
with (7)
events are pairwise space-like separated. Analogously to
the qubit, the correlations (“exclusivity”) mean nothing
other than conservation of energy ensured by nonlocal
coordination of detections. And also here the three de-
tection events should be considered a single measurement
result as for instance: “detector D0 counts and detectors
D1 and D2 don’t count”. If one changes the basis (by
rotating the Stern-Gerlach) the detectors corresponding
to the new basis define a completely different apparatus,
even if the two basis have a projector in common.
More in general, the standard postulate that “observ-
ables corresponding to a complete set of orthogonal pro-
jection operators have simultaneously definite measure-
ment values” does not mean that the value can be as-
signed to each single detector separately of the others.
Each projector is not an entity for it alone, separate from
the other commuting projectors defining the basis of the
experiment (this is also the message quantum contextual-
ity conveys, as we will see in the next Subsection VII B).
The “weirdness of the quantum” originates from the “
classical” prejudice that one can define “variables” which
are independent from each other.
Notice that in the preceding reasoning it is crucial to
assume that the measurements at D0, D1 and D2 are
pairwise space-like separated. Otherwise the correlations
could be explained classically, that is by means of rela-
tivistic local-causality or influences propagating at veloc-
ity v ≤ c. Certainly, one could explain the qutrit exper-
iment also locally by means of Einstein’s “ghost-waves”,
as those referred to previously, but the explanation would
fail for experiments with 2 entangled qutrits.
In experiments with 2 or more particles, nonlocality at
detection appears in the form of Bell nonlocality, that is,
8as correlations between space-like separated events that
violate Bell inequalities; Bell nonlocality ensures conser-
vation of linear and angular momentum.
Notwithstanding that nonlocality came to fame with
the discovery of Bell’s theorem [23], it would be awkward
that such a crucial feature prevailed only in multipartite
systems and hence failed in systems with a prime number
of states (Hilbert spaces with prime dimension), played a
decisive role in 2 qubits systems corresponding to Hilbert
spaces with d = 4 but had no significance in single par-
ticle spin 3/2 systems, which also correspond to Hilbert
spaces with d = 4. Such oddities disappear as soon as
one acknowledges (in line with the “collapse postulate”)
that “nonlocality” rules the whole quantum realm, from
the single qubit or two-state systems (Hilbert space with
d = 2) onwards, in the form of “nonlocality at detection”.
In favor of this view also speaks the fact that experimen-
tal demonstration of Bell nonlocality requires space-like
separated detection events. “Nonlocality at detection”
[21] is the fundamental and general form of “nonlocal-
ity”, and historically also the first one.
B. Quantum contextuality and “classicality”
The assumption that each projector is an entity for
it alone, separate from the other commuting projectors
defining the basis of the experiment bears a contradic-
tion. This is the theorem Simon Kochen and Ernst
Specker proved (1967) in Hilbert space of d = 3 using
117 rays (projectors) [2]. Later simplified versions of the
theorem have been produced. In 1991 a proof was pro-
vided with 33 rays also for d = 3. The minimal possible
K&S set consists of 18 rays in Hilbert space of d = 4
[24, 26], and leads to the particularly simple proof repro-
duced in Fig. 5:
One defines 18 projection operators Pij = |vij〉〈vij |
onto each of the 18 unitary vectors. Because of the or-
thogonality relations it holds that for each basis the pro-
jection operators commute pairwise, and when measured,
one of them must yield value 1 and the other three value
0:
[Pij , Pkj ] = 0; i, k ∈ {1, 4}, i 6= k; j ∈ {1, 9} (6)
Pij = a, a ∈ {0, 1},
4∑
i=1
Pij = 1 (7)
Consider now a non-contextual theory that assigns a
value to each Pij independently of the basis in which
it is measured. Since each Pij appears repeated in two
different basis in Fig. 5 one is led to a contradiction with
(7).
To test experimentally this contradiction one intro-
duces observables Aij = I − 2Pij = a, a ∈ {−1, 1},
which by definition fulfill the compatibility condition:
[Aij , Akj ], i, k ∈ {1, 4}, i 6= k. Non-contextual theo-
ries assuming that measurement of Aij is not correlated
with other “compatible measurements” fulfill the follow-
ing inequality [26]:
9∑
j=1
A1j ·A2j ·A3j ·A4j ≤ 7 (8)
This inequality is violated by quantum theory, which
predicts:
9∑
j=1
A1j ·A2j ·A3j ·A4j = 9 (9)
In the context of the Stern-Gerlach experiment with
single spin 1 particles the theorem has the following
meaning: Theories assuming values that are a) prede-
termined before measurement, and b) non-contextually
assigned, cannot reproduce the correlations appearing in
this single qutrit experiment.
Indeed non-contextual assignment of values implies
that for some bases two of the three detectors would si-
multaneously count. This leads to a non-contextuality
inequality similar to that in (8). Violation of this in-
equality proves that the values are not assigned to each
single projector for it alone but takes account of the basis
of measurement.
Nevertheless this contextuality could in principle be
explained classically by means of local influences between
detection events as far as these events are time-like sep-
arated.
This shows that an ideal contextuality experiment ex-
pands the conditions of the qubit experiment in [21]
to a qutrit one: In fact in both experiments one tests
whether the number of coincidence counts is significant
larger than noise and fortuitous 2-particle events when
detections happen space-like separated. And in both ex-
periments lack of coincidences prove that conservation of
energy in single quantum events is granted by “nonlocal
coordination” of detections. And this seems to me is the
“physical justification” of contextuality Ernst Specker
and Simon Kochen were longing for [27].
Regarding inequality (8) it has been claimed that“[Its]
derivation is similar to a standard derivation of a Bell
inequality. The only difference is that in a Bell inequal-
ity we assume that the result of a measurement of Aij is
independent of spacelike separated measurements, while
here we assume that it is independent of compatible mea-
surements.” [26, 28]
Nonetheless, in the light of our preceding analysis one
should correctly rather state: In both cases, Bell and
non-contextuality inequalities, the derivation rests on as-
signment of values to each projector for it alone, without
taking account of the basis of measurement. And in both
cases, Bell and contextuality experiments, space-like sep-
arated detection events are necessary to rule out any clas-
sical explanation of observed correlations by means of
causal relativistic connections (signals propagating with
v ≤ c), that is, information contained within space-time.
9One may be tempted to object: “The correlations
are exactly the same regardless whether there are or
not space-like separation. Quantum mechanics is still
there even if you are poor to achieve space-like separa-
tion.” But, how can you know if you don’t perform the
“space-like separation” experiment?: “Unperformed ex-
periments have no results”. So one can’t help calling on
[21] for help and extrapolate this result to argue that
any experiment using space-like separated detectors can
be supposed to yield the same correlated results as ex-
periments with time-like separation.
One should also be careful in using the concept of “in-
dependence”. Undoubtedly, if Alice‘s measurement at A
and Bob‘s measurement at B are uncorrelated (randomly
distributed) like the tossing of two fair coins, then we can
deduce that they are “independent” from each other, or
“happen without disturbing each other”: neither event
can be considered to cause the other one.
However if both measurements prove to be correlated
beyond the bound “biased coins” or “non-contextually as-
signed values” can produce, what can we deduce?:
If the distance A-B is such that the tossing at A hap-
pens time-like before the tossing at B (as it is the case
in experiments with sequential measurements), then we
cannot exclude that the correlations are produced by
some signal traveling with velocity v ≤ c from A to B.
By contrast, if the distance A-B is such that the tossing
at A is space-like separated from the tossing at B we
can conclude that the correlation cannot be explained by
any connection in space-time, even if one can say that
neither Alice’s result depends on Bob’s one, nor Bob’s
result depends on Alice’s one: The correlated outcomes
form a joint result coming from outside space-time.
In this sense the concept of “independence” alone
seems not helpful to distinguishing quantum contextual
correlations from classical ones, and consequently ex-
periments with sequential measurements don’t rule out
classical explanation for demonstrated contextual corre-
lations.
This applies in particular to the ongoing test presented
in [31]. The experiment uses a single trapped-ion qutrit
to demonstrate the violation of a non-contextuality in-
equality which is the qutrit counterpart of that in (8).
The qutrit basis states are represented by three fine-
structure levels in a ion 40Ca+: |0〉 = |S1/2(mj = −1/2)〉
in the ground-state manifold, and |1〉 = |D5/2(mj =
−3/2)〉 and |2〉 = |D5/2(mj = −1/2)〉 in the metastable
D5/2 manifold. For the sake of our analysis it suffices to
say that the measurement happens by means of only one
detector monitoring the state |0〉. If this detector counts
(photons scattered by the ion) the qutrit is projected
onto |0〉 (which accordingly is called “bright state”); if
the detector doesn’t count the qutrit is projected onto a
superposition of the states |1〉 and |2〉 in the D5/2 mani-
fold (which accordingly are called “dark states”).
The experiment could be compared to an Stern-
Gerlach experiment using a single particle spin 1 qutrit,
where one monitors only the output port corresponding
to the basis state |0〉: If the detector counts the qutrit is
projected onto |0〉, if it does’nt count one deduces that
the qutrit is projected onto a superposition of the states
|+ 1〉 and | − 1〉. This deduction is equivalent to assume
that each of the three output ports corresponding to the
three basis states is monitored by a detector.
Currently the experiment in [31] uses sequential mea-
surements and not space-like separated ones. Thus it
does not discard in principle the possibility that one out-
come determines locally the next one and a classical ma-
chine simulates quantum contextuality. However such
a simulation requires memory: “while simulating quan-
tum nonlocality with classical systems requires superlu-
minal communication [...], simulating quantum contextu-
ality requires memory [...] or, more precisely, the ability
of storing and recovering certain amount of classical in-
formation.” [32]. The experiment establishes lower lim-
its to the number of bits of classical memory needed for
that task. To increase the difficulty of simulation and
“prevent a hypothetically conspiring ion from knowing
what the context of a measurement will be” one ran-
domizes the sequence of measured observables using a
QRNG [31]: “a single quantum system is submitted to
an unlimited sequence of measurements, randomly [em-
phasis added] chosen from a finite set of measurements”
[32]. But acknowledging “the randomness of the QRNG”
means nothing other than acknowledging the result of
[21], i.e.: nonlocality at detection.
In summary, one can hardly deny that “relativistic-
local causality” is a classical feature. Therefore, decid-
ing between “quantum correlations” and “classical ones”
requires space-like separated (i.e: locally independent)
detection outcomes.
Accordingly the claim that “quantum contextuality [is]
a natural generalization of quantum nonlocality to the
case of nonspacelike separated systems”[32] is equivocal:
Contextuality is certainly more general than Bell non-
locality but less general than “nonlocality at detection”;
and to be “quantum” contextuality has to hold for space-
like separated systems.
One should avoid by all means reducing nonlocality to
“Bell nonlocality” or conflating “classicality” and “non-
contextuality”. One can claim that “Bell nonlocality is a
white dog and contextuality is the dog”, nonetheless one
should not forget to add that “nonlocality at detection
makes the dog”, so that Implication (5) becomes:
Violation of non-contextual inequalities (10)
∧ Space-like separated detection events
=⇒ Nonlocality at detection =⇒ Quantum
It is also worth stressing that contextual correlations
demonstrated by experiment with space-like separated
detections imply that “values predetermined before mea-
surement” are not information stored within space-time
in “classical memories”, but exist nonlocally, outside
space-time (in the “prophet’s mind”). In this sense quan-
tum contextuality, non-realism, and nonlocality at detec-
10
tion are one and the same feature. “Non-realism” is cer-
tainly “a fundamental key of the world” [29], but it is
inseparable from “nonlocality at detection”.
C. Future contingents, the Classical,
and the Quantum
The conclusions in the preceding Subsection VII B can
be strengthened on the basis of Simon Kochen’s recon-
struction of quantum mechanics [33, 34].
The corner stone of Kochen’s reconstruction is found
in the following quotation referring to EPR experiments:
“How can correlations between spin components of two
particles subsist when these spin components do not have
values? To understand how this can happen it is neces-
sary to distinguish between events that have already hap-
pened and future contingent events. Thus, for instance,
if a∨ b is currently true, then either a is true or b is true.
When future events are considered, this no longer the
case: if a ∨ b is certain to happen, it is not the case that
a is certain to happen or b is certain to take place.”[34]
As a famous example of this logical feature Kochen
refers to Aristotle’s sea battle: “A sea-fight must either
take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it
should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that
it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either
should or should not take place tomorrow. Since propo-
sitions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in
future events there is a real alternative, and a potential-
ity in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation
and denial have the same character.” [34]
Here one implicitly introduces the following
Definition: An event a is called future contingent with
relation to a future time T, if to establish whether event
a takes place or not one has to await time T.
It is interesting to compare Aristotle’s example of the
“sea battle” with the statement: “The Sun will raise to-
morrow at time T at point P of the horizon”.
The “sea battle” is a future contingent event with re-
lation to “tomorrow”. By contrast, according to classical
physics the raising of the Sun is not a future contingent
event because it is assumed we can know today about it
with certainty.
According to the Definition above it is impossible even
in principle to predict with certainty whether event a will
take place or not on the basis of the currently observable
data, that is on the basis of information stored within
space-time.
This is the same as assuming that on the basis of clas-
sical physics we can establish neither that “a will happen
at time T” nor that “a will not happen at time T”. In
other words the Definition of future contingents is equiv-
alent to the following
Principle Q: Whether event a happens or not at time T
depends on information coming from outside space-time
at time T.
This Principle Q is for me the key feature singling out
quantum from classical.
The classical view implies actually that no event is fu-
ture contingent: Any event can in principle be predicted
with certainty.
In case of Aristotle’s sea battle Principle Q amounts to
postulate human free will, i.e.: steering of outcomes in
human brains happening from outside space-time; this
might also be the reason why Thomas Aquinas postu-
lates that “the universe would not be perfect without
randomness” [45]. Quantum experiments (single-particle
Mach-Zehnder interference, single-particle spin 1 Stern-
Gerlach, EPR-Bell experiments) allow us to go beyond:
We postulate free will on the part of the experimenter
and observe correlations between space-like separated de-
tection events; thereby we experimentally demonstrate
information coming from outside space-time in devices
other than human brains.
Principle Q is the core of the standard postulate about
the “collapse of the wavefunction” Einstein rejected as
early as 1927 in the Solvay Congress invoking conflict
with relativistic local causality.
Nonlocal correlations that cannot be explained by
NOT-faster-than-light communication between detectors
is a particular case of Principle Q : Which of the possible
alternative outcomes happens is unpredictable in princi-
ple.
In summary Kochen’s “logical” reconstruction of quan-
tum physics rests on Principle Q and is consistent with
nonlocal correlations between detection events.
This said, one can’t help admiring how much quan-
tum physics was already contained in Aristotle’s logical
description about the “sea battle”, and Ernst Specker’s
insight about the relationship between Quantum and “In-
futurabilien”.
VIII. CAN NATURE BE “MORE NONLOCAL”
OR “LESS NONLOCAL” THAN QUANTUM?
If one takes violation of “the CSHS (Bell) inequality”
as the basic characteristic of quantum nonlocality then it
is tantalizing to ask whether there can be in nature nonlo-
cality beyond the Tsirelson bound. However if one takes
“nonlocality at detection” (as demonstrated in [21]) as
axiom of quantum theory then it is obvious that it does
not make sense to speak about “more nonlocality than
the quantum one”. And the other way around, one can-
not have “less nonlocality than the quantum one”: As
concluded in [36], any disappearance of nonlocal coordi-
nation between detections violates straightforwardly the
conservation of energy in the single quantum events; al-
ternative models assuming “local parts” would lead to a
violation of “energy conservation” and can be considered
refuted by the experiment in [21].
It is interesting to see that “Bell inequalities” can be
considered a particular case of “Non-contextuality in-
equalities”, and that assumption of “exclusivity princi-
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ple” allows to rule out PR Boxes and other beyond quan-
tum theories [26, 29, 30]. This confirms the conclusion
that “Bell nonlocality” originates from “nonlocality at
detection”, since as stated in Section VII, “exclusivity”
is another way to formulate nonlocally underpinned con-
servation of energy. Accordingly, in searching to derive
the quantum from principles, it may be convenient to
take account of this state of affairs.
As a matter of fact the “quantum algebra” (leading
to violation of Bell inequalities, “Tsirelson bound” and
contextuality) emerges from experiments demonstrating
“single particle interference” (e.g.: Double-slit, Mach-
Zehnder): Describing interference requires the notion of
“wave-packet”. Shaping a “wave-packet” means weav-
ing “locality” (particles) with “nonlocal threads” (plane-
waves) using the tool of “Fourier transforms”. Thus
the very introduction of “wave packets” amounts to as-
sume local from nonlocal (paraphrasing Wheeler’s “it
from bit”) as principle for Quantum, and yields the si-
nusoidal dependence on phases characteristic of quantum
correlations [37]. Additionally, “single particle interfer-
ence” implies (see Section VII) that each jointly result of
the corresponding detectors should be considered a sin-
gle measurement result coming from outside space-time.
Accordingly different phases define in general different
bases and different measurements incompatible with each
other: sharp measurements in one basis exclude sharp
measurements in a different basis.
On the one hand, the Fourier transform can be gen-
eralized first to describe all possible single and multiple
qubit systems by means of Hadamard, phase and Pauli
operators (see for instance [42]), and thereafter to Hilbert
spaces with d ≥ 3 through ladder operators. On the
other hand the impossibility of sharply measuring both
a variable and its Fourier transformed (Heisenberg’s un-
certainty principle) can be generalized through commu-
tation rules between operators to describe the incompat-
ibility of sharp measurements in different basis.
This means that the sinusoidal dependence on phases
leading to the violation of Bell inequalities originates
from the Fourier transform. And the same holds for
the commutation rules between operators leading to con-
textuality and the Tsirelson bound. From this perspec-
tive “nonlocality at detection” bears the “quantum al-
gebra” founding “contextuality” (characterizing Hilbert
spaces with d ≥ 3) and “Bell nonlocality” (characterizing
Hilbert spaces with d ≥ 4, d non prime), and rules the
whole quantum realm (Hilbert space with d ≥ 2).
Local from nonlocal is the strong physical meaning
“Fourier transforms” contain: Although the founding fa-
thers were not aware of this meaning, it was underpin-
ning all the derivations they achieved to account for the
“wave-particle” behavior appearing in quantum exper-
iments. In any case the founding fathers undoubtedly
derived the Quantum from “a set of experimentally mo-
tivated postulates” [19], which in the light of nonlocal-
ity and contextuality acquire a much deeper meaning. I
think these so improved principles may very well be those
we are looking for in seeking to get “Quantum from prin-
ciples”.
All this makes plain the interest of the “single-photon
space-like Michelson-Morley experiment” [43] to demon-
strate that quantum physics (with the Fourier trans-
form) and relativity (with the Lorentz transformation)
have common experimental ground and imply each other.
Both quantum nonlocal and relativistic local correla-
tions happen without continuous connection in space-
time: Observed events are correlated without “particles”
traveling through trajectories in space-time, that is, with-
out continuous connection in between.
In this respect it is noteworthy that Kochen’s recon-
struction of quantum mechanics is based on single par-
ticle Mach-Zehnder interference experiments and intro-
duces the sinusoidal dependence on phases [48]. Even if
no physical motivation is given for such a dependence,
Kochen’s reconstruction makes it plain that any attempt
to get Quantum from principles assumes (openly or hid-
denly) nonlocal ingredients and the construction of “wave
packets” by means of “Fourier transforms”. And it is also
worth mentioning that quantum cryptography (BB84-
protocol) and quantum computing (Deutsch-algorithm)
have been discovered and first technologically imple-
mented using single qubit interference. Thus, although
Bell- and contextuality inequalities look as promising re-
sources for developing powerful cryptographic and com-
puting tools, the pioneer quantum technologies reaching
the market are based on “nonlocality at detection”.
IX. “INFUTURABILIEN-NUMBER” IS FINITE
AND DEFINES “LAWS OF NATURE”
The discussion of the preceding Sections means that
the prophet can contextually assign values to all possi-
ble choices the suitors can do as sketched in Fig.3, pro-
vided his assignment is nonlocal and for all possible ex-
periments.
The invisible quantum realm is in fact a huge men-
tal ensemble of possible outcomes which is not stored in
material memories but rather lies outside space-time (in
God’s mind), and contains as an essential ingredient all
possible setting-choices humans of all times can perform,
as sketched in Fig.3. Deutsch’s Multiverse [13] is a subset
of this ensemble.
By freely choosing the settings of the apparatus here
and now the experimenter makes that one of the possible
outcome worlds becomes real or visible. The “freedom”
on the part of nature has been some times interpreted in
the sense that “if we have free will, elementary particles
must have that ability, too” [38], or also “either no true
randomness at all, or omnipresent randomness”.[10] In
the context of the discussion about“divine omniscience
and human free will” this interpretation would corre-
spond to the solution that God neither knows the choice
we will make nor its outcome, before we do it.
However the very notion of “elementary particle’s free
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will” seems self-contradictory for the quantum correla-
tions imply nonlocal spontaneous choices, and ‘particle’
refers to well localized entities. The so called “sponta-
neous choices of particles” are nothing other that “God’s
spontaneous choices” for assigning outcomes in his mind
to all possible human experiments according to distribu-
tions that can be predicted by the quantum mechanical
“Born rule”. In this sense stating that “randomness is
omnipresent” amounts to state that it results from both
human and divine free-will: Randomness is a particular
case of free will, and divine omniscience can, in principle,
be consistently extended to conditioning on alternatives
mutually excluding each other.
This implementation of Specker’s parable naturally
supports two different interpretations of the Born rule
depending on the perspective one takes:
• As giving the frequency of occurrences of an out-
come in the sequence of assignments in the omni-
scient mind, which is the actual observed frequency
in experiment. This interpretation corresponds to
the standard one using “frequentist probabilities”
(called BornF in [48]).
• As quantifying a subjective belief of the experi-
menter about the outcome of a future measure-
ment. This interpretation reflects the incapacity
of principle to access the result of a measurement
before performing it. It is characteristic of QBism
[49, 50] and uses “Bayesian probabilities”: The
probability of an outcome is defined as “the max-
imum price a rational agent would pay to enter a
bet with payoff 1 if a determined outcome is ob-
served, and no payoff otherwise” (called BornB in
[48])
Nonetheless, at the end of the day both interpretations
are equivalent, since the assignments in the omniscient
mind are done in such a way that the factual frequencies
occurring in experiment are well fitted by the Bayesian
probabilities.
It is a well known theological theorem that God’s in-
finite power does not mean, he can make a thing to be
not made (for this would imply that two contradicto-
ries are true at the same time), and likewise he cannot
make anything to be absolutely infinite.[44] Accordingly
we assume that the number of all possible measurement
choices experimenters of all times can do is very large but
finite, and call this the “Infuturabilien-number” using the
term invented by Ernst Specker. Note however that the
number of possible mathematical theorems about nat-
ural numbers is infinite since these relate to necessary
truths, which can be considered participation to God’s
knowledge by finite minds.
The finiteness of the “Infuturabilien-number” has no-
ticeable Implications:
I. The discreteness of space-time: If space-time were
continuum the number of possible setting-choices
each human could in principle do would be un-
countable many. The mathematics of continuum
Newtonian physics employs to represent the world
implies that “any calculation of complete informa-
tion about, say, a particle position, would require
an infinitely long computation.” This fact has pro-
foundly disturbed many physicists [46] and still dis-
turbs them today: “ ‘Real numbers’ aren’t real at
all” (Nicolas Gisin [41]).
II. Upper bound for signaling (v ≤ c): Without such
a bound the number of possible experiments each
human being could in principle do even assuming
discrete space-time would be countable but infinite.
III. The heat death of the universe: Even with the condi-
tions I and II fulfilled, the number of possible choices
of experimental settings humans could in principle
make would be infinite many, if humanity could live
for ever. So the finiteness of the “Infuturabilien-
number” implies that “within a finite period of time
to come the earth must again be, unfit for the habi-
tation of man as at present constituted”.[39] This
was the way Lord Kelvin formulated the second law
of thermodynamics, although obviously one should
use the term ‘universe’ instead ‘earth’, if one con-
siders that humanity could in principle live outside
the earth.
To get a flavor of the magnitude of the “Infuturabilien-
number” consider again Fig.3. If suitor N had decided
to make other choices, he would have produced histo-
ries other than the represented one. Assuming 8 rounds
and 3 possible choices, the number of possible histories
is 38. And the number of possible histories for 10 Suit-
ors would amount to 380. We assume signaling bounded
by the speed of light and the quantum or pixel of space-
time defined by the Planck’s length and time. Suppose
additionally that the conditions for heat death of the
universe lead to death of humanity 109 years from now.
Then the number of different settings (space-pixels) a
single human being can choose in a given pixel of time
amounts roughly to 3 ·108×109×31 ·106× 11.6·1035 ≈ 1060
pixels in one direction, and 10180 space-pixels. Accord-
ingly the number of possible different histories a hu-
man being living 100 years (1053 time pixels) can gen-
erate is of the order 10180×10
53
= 101.8×10
55
. And the
number of possible histories the 7.5 billion people living
presently on earth (assuming everyone lives 100 years)
could in principle generate is of the order of magnitude
of 101.8×10
55×7.5×109 ≈ 101065 .
Regarding Implications I and II, it is worth mentioning
that by reducing gravity to a geometric property of space-
time, general relativity unavoidably involves singularities
and “carries within itself the seeds of its own destruc-
tion.” Thus Implication I helps to solve this problem. On
the other hand these Implications fit to the experiment
in [43], which (as stated in Section VIII) demonstrates
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that relativistic local correlations happen without con-
tinuous connections. The introduction of the space-time
continuum (geometry and “real” numbers) in physics is
a useful idealization, but it should not be considered a
“real” structure underpinning the physical world.[41]
Regarding Implication III, one could object that Lord
Kelvin is not formulating the “second law” but rather
a consequence of it, and that similarly the principle of
the finite “Infuturabilien-number” should be considered
a consequence of the second law and not the other way
around.
This is an interesting point that brings to light that
possibly different principles are subsumed under the term
“second law of thermodynamics”, and we discuss this in
the next Section X.
X. DEATH, THE “SECOND LAW”, AND THE
MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
If one assumes Boltzmann’s formulation of “the second
law” one is led to infer that “there is always a non-zero
probability ... of exceptions where the law fails to hold”.
Boltzmann’s thermodynamics does not completely forbid
that heat flows from a cold to a hot body, but states only
that this happens with exponentially small probability
[40]:
Suppose a gas consisting of N molecules fills a room.
The molecules could in principle spontaneously be all in
the left half of the room. This would correspond to an
entropy decrease of 4S = Nkln2 and the probability
that this happens is 2−N .
It is actually astonishing that a “law” supposed to es-
tablish that the “entropy” (whatever it is) of the universe
always increases admits that such a quantity may be sub-
mitted to “statistical fluctuations”.
To avoid this oddity I would like to propose that the
meaning of the “second law” is not well-defined and ac-
tually conflates two different principles:
• The “irreversibility” of an event like the death of
humanity, which can happen only once.
• The “irreversibility” of events like the death of the
human person, which may admit “exceptions”, that
is, statistical fluctuations.
The “second law” as formulated by Lord Kelvin relates
to the death of humanity, and in this context “increase of
entropy” means “time arrow”: the fact that each pixel of
time is a step approaching the “infuturabilien-number”
and diminishing the quantity of remaining choices to per-
form.
By contrast the “second law” in the statistical Boltz-
man formulation relates to processes like the death of
a human person. Physicians define death as the “irre-
versible” break-down of all the brain functions included
brainstem. What do they mean by “irreversible”? Just
that a damage happens beyond our capabilities to repair.
Another similar process may be “detection”, which in the
precedent Sections has been proved to play a key role in
Quantum Physics. The process by which an outcome be-
comes registered (the detection or measurement) is de-
fined with relation to the capabilities of the human ob-
server (the way the human brain functions after all): At
detection something happens beyond our capabilities to
restore. At detection new information appears in space-
time in form of some observable mark or sign (blackening,
scintillation, sound). This mark evolves visibly thereafter
according to a “deterministic-looking” pattern, that is,
the future of the evolution is determined by the past with
probability 1 (actually not absolutely 1, as we will see
in the coming Sections). The very meaning of quantum
measurement is that when a system collapses, it collapses
for all observers (as stated in Section IV).
Accordingly “Boltzman’s second law” should be refor-
mulated to account for the limit of our capacity to repair.
A process is irreversible because the complexity of the re-
versing task is beyond our operational capabilities. For
the time being the conditions defining this irreversibility
threshold (likely involving a new constant of nature) are
unknown: This is the “measurement problem”. Para-
phrasing Stefan Wolf: The key to thermodynamics may
lie within the quantum measurement process.[40]
The “measurement problem” is somewhat the physical
correlate of the “halting problem” in arithmetics. How-
ever in arithmetics we can sharply prove that at any time
T there will be questions about numbers that we can-
not answer with the methods available at time T (the
well known Turing’s theorem). By contrast in physics we
cannot yet sharply prove (we only intuitively feel) that
at any time T there will be physical processes (for in-
stance death) that lie beyond our capabilities to restore,
and therefore are irreversible with relation to the human
capabilities. In this sense interpretations of quantum me-
chanics can basically be split into two types: those ac-
knowledging “irreversibility” (with relation to human ca-
pabilities) and in particular death as a main constituent
of physical reality, and those assuming that humans will
once overcome death at will by technical means.
XI. BORN’S RULE AND SCHRO¨DINGER’S
CAT ARE INCOMPATIBLE
As said in the preceding Section X, after collapse the
registered result follows a deterministic world-line (ac-
cording to the equations of General Relativity) so that
the future can be predicted with certainty. Accepting
“superposition of macroscopic objects” (“Schro¨dinger’s
cat”) means to reject “laws of nature” prescribing def-
inite trajectories, or what is the same, predictions that
something will be observed at a certain place with prob-
ability 1.
Consequently if one assumes (“Schro¨dinger’s cat”) one
should also reject “quantum-mechanical laws” imposing
that “the measurement of a quantum system will with
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certainty give a determined outcome”.
Frauchiger-Renner’s “assumption (Q)” in [11] includes
together “superposition for arbitrary quantum measure-
ments on cats” and “deterministic statements for quan-
tum measurements on microscopic scales”.
To this extent “assumption (Q)” in [11] seems to be
self-contradictory and, if so, the merit of [11] consists
mainly in bringing to light this fact.
So one could think we are contrived to choose between
two alternatives regarding the equations we use to de-
scribe the physical reality (General Relativity, Born’s
rule):
• They express inexorable laws of nature, that is, ob-
jective features intrinsic to physical reality. Accord-
ingly they forbid as well “Schro¨dinger’s cats” as
deviations from quantum mechanical probability 1
predictions (like in the case of certainty previously
mentioned).
• They express subjective beliefs (QBism). Accord-
ingly they neither exclude “Schro¨dinger’s cats”, nor
deviations from the quantum mechanical probabil-
ity assignments.
Nonetheless I dare to propose a third alternative blend-
ing “realistic” and “subjective” aspects: Both, the Born
rule and the equations of General Relativity, ordinarily
hold and can be considered real ingredients of our world,
nonetheless both admit exceptions under certain circum-
stances to be specified in the following, and in this sense
they are subjective. In other words, there is no inexorable
law of nature that fits all possible phenomena that may
happen in the world; however the mathematical equa-
tions we use to describe and predict the world fit well
the ordinary regularities relevant to our life and in this
sense are real ingredients of the world we live in.
I first consider in the next Section XII the case of de-
viations from the Born rule, and subsequently in Section
XIII the case of deviations “deterministic-looking” equa-
tions describing the visible (“macroscopic”) world, like
the equations of General Relativity.
XII. BORN’S RULE, SLEEP, AND
PURPOSEFUL ACTION
Consider the outcomes my brain produces while writ-
ing this article. I mentally steer my brain’s outcomes,
that is, the sequences of bits they consist in: I can make
that the distribution of bits during a short period de-
viates from the quantum mechanical predictions for a
large number of outcomes. By contrast these could be
considered valid for an observer watching me while I am
sleeping. The outcome bit-string of a human brain tends
towards its most probable sequence, i.e.: a meaningless
bit string, in absence of purposeful control (in absence of
conscious free-will), that is, during sleep. In presence of
purposeful control (awake period), the outcome bit-string
human brains “print” may very well be meaningful, and
in fact some times it is!
The Born rule fits well the outcomes of systems act-
ing aimlessly according to a “random” pattern, and in
this sense can be considered to describe reality prop-
erly. Nonetheless it fails when applied to minds devi-
ating purposefully from random, and hence do not fit
the whole set of outcomes happening in the world. In
this sense the Born rule is “subjective” or incomplete,
in agreement with QBism. In particular, the predic-
tion that a measurement upon a determined quantum
system (e.g.: a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with equal
arm-lengths) yields an outcome with “probability 1” does
not mean that “nature is obliged” to produce this out-
come. In Chris Fuchs’ wording: “All probabilities, in-
cluding all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they
never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-
1 assignments.”[49] The use of probability in physics is
always an “idealization” [33] “for all practical purposes”.
The Born rule does not inexorably apply to the realm
of human freedom and creativity.
From this one should not infer we can invoke quantum
mechanics to “explain” so called “para-normal” phenom-
ena. It is claimed for instance that “psi-subjects” can
change the counting rate of a detector in an interference
experiment by acting “mentally” upon the detector with-
out physically changing the phase-parameters. Such phe-
nomena are not impossible but beyond our technological
capabilities: We are as less capable of producing them as
putting macroscopic objects in superposition of two dis-
tant locations (see next Section XIII); I cannot act upon
devices in the lab the same way as I act upon my brain.
Quantum mechanics does not forbid “para-normal” ef-
fects, but it does not provide methods to take hold of
them.
XIII. CLASSICAL “DETERMINISM” AND
“SCHRO¨DINGER’S CAT”
In the preceding Section XII we have discussed devi-
ations from Born’s rule that happen in purposeful ac-
tion. The other side of the coin are deviations from
“deterministic-looking” patterns in the visible (“macro-
scopic”) world like those described by the equations of
Classical Mechanics and General Relativity.
Such equations and rules fit well the outcomes we usu-
ally observe. This amazing fact makes it possible for us
to behave “rationally”: We would for instance pay no
price to enter a bet with payoff 1 if the sun begins to
dance in the sky tomorrow at noon, and no payoff if it
follows its usual trajectory. In this sense “deterministic-
looking” rules bearing probability 1 predictions meet a
basic content of physical reality.
Nonetheless (following QBism) we accept that no prob-
ability 1 equation or rule whatsoever can completely fit
the whole set of outcomes the “omniscient mind” assigns
to any phenomenon. The omniscient mind is kind to us
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and distributes the subset of outcomes we usually observe
according to regularities we can grasp, but it may also
assign outcomes deviating from these regularities under
extraordinary circumstances. The times when these de-
viations come to happen are unpredictable in principle,
the same way as the single outcomes in most quantum
experiments are unpredictable. The attempt to cast Gen-
eral Relativity into a probabilistic formulation (Quantum
Gravity) supports a QBist perspective: The “determin-
istic looking” equations of General Relativity, not less
than Born’s rule, are utterly “subjective” or incomplete:
There is no inexorable law of nature.
If there is no “law” forbidding nature to produce phe-
nomena which deviate from the regularities we are used
to (i.e.: phenomena violating our probability 1 predic-
tions), then (“Schro¨dinger’s cats”) are not completely for-
bidden. This means that visible objects can in principle
be in a superposition for instance of being at two distant
locations: that the sun starts spinning in the sky, or a
dead resurrects are not impossible events but only highly
improbable ones. In other words, they happen with prob-
ability 1 in the ordinary world we are used to, but not
absolutely. How low their absolute probability is, we don’t
know, and this data may even be beyond what we will
ever know, but in any case the occurrence of such highly
improbable events does not break any “inexorable law of
nature”.
However the reverse implication holds as well: We can-
not contrive nature to produce such deviations the same
way we contrive it to make a friend’s mobile ring by send-
ing him a message. Producing such extraordinary events
is beyond our technological capabilities, as it is phoning
faster than light.
For this reason we endorse the view that human exper-
imenters cannot cause visible entities (detectors) to be
in quantum superposition. By contrast the omniscient
mind (the “prophet” in Specker’s parable) containing all
the possible worlds can conceive histories with such a su-
perposition, and therefore even produce that observers
at a certain place perceive the sun spinning while other
observers in another place perceive it as usual (in accord
with the result in [11], version 1).
When “irreversible processes” become reversed and
phenomena spontaneously deviate from the trajectories
that we are used to, people of all times tends to refer to
them as “miracles”: In this sense a “miracle” does not
violate any “law of nature”; it is simply a highly improv-
able event, sort of “Schro¨dinger’s cat”, the realization of
which is beyond our technological capabilities.
This analysis allows us to complete the conclusion of
Section XII:
On the one hand, all rules we use to predict nature do
not exhaust the whole physical reality (all the outcomes
assignments by the “omniscient mind” and other minds)
and in this sense can be considered “subjective” or in-
complete: The Born rule in quantum mechanics and the
“determistic-looking” equations in general relativity are
about the decision-making behavior any individual agent
should strive for to avoid being Dutch-booked [49, 50].
On the other hand, these rules fit well a highly sig-
nificant part of physical reality: the subset of outcomes
shaping the regularities we are used to. Thereby they
make it possible for us to predict, develop technologies,
and live, and in this sense can be considered “objective”
and even an ingredient of the physical reality.
In summary, the set of outcome assignments in the om-
niscient mind consists of two subsets: one containing the
assignments defining the usual regularities we observe,
and the other shaping extraordinary phenomena. The
equations of General Relativity and the Born rule are at
the same time “objective” (real) and “subjective” (in-
complete).
This also allow us to distinguish two types of visible
phenomena: Those we can perform by physical opera-
tions (as for instance letting a mobile ring, influencing
detection rates by changing phases), and those beyond
our physical capabilities (letting a dead resurrect, revers-
ing a detection, changing the counting rate of a detector
through “mental power”). For “deterministic” and “ran-
dom” phenomena we are able to develop algorithms, but
we cannot seize hold of freedom. The distinction between
what is and is not possible for human experimenters is
likely more important than the distinction between clas-
sical and quantum.
XIV. DETECTORS REQUIRE REST MASS
In this article we have stressed the central role detec-
tors play in quantum physics: Detectors are devices that
make visible information coming from the invisible quan-
tum realm. A non-trivial quantum experiment is always
defined with relation to a number of detectors, at least 2,
and in this sense our view is as relational as Carlo Rov-
elli’s one.[19] The set of relevant detectors defines the
complete set of projectors and the dimension of the cor-
responding Hilbert space.
Quantum theory is certainly “a theory about
information”.[19] However one should specify: “about in-
formation available to the human observer”; “device in-
dependent quantum key distribution” can hardly mean
“distribution without detectors”.
Defining accurately what makes a detector to detect,
or what is the same establishing when precisely a detec-
tion event happens, is part of the unsolved measurement
problem. However one can safely say that a detector
must be a massif device, something with rest-mass, fully
in agreement with Bohr’s postulate about “the indispens-
able use of classical concepts in the interpretation of all
proper measurements” [9].
In Section VIII we referred to the “wave packet”
to show how local entities (“particles”) can be shaped
from nonlocal ingredients (“monochromatic waves”) us-
ing Fourier transforms. This picture would remain in-
complete without an explicit reference to the property
of mass. It is well known that the search for mecha-
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nisms explaining how particles (“wave packets”) acquire
mass is currently a main concern in particle physics. In
any case rest mass is apparently a parameter nature uses
to produce entities moving within space time, that is, at
velocity v < c: It is by acquiring mass that local “energy-
packets” become “matter-packets”, the suitable bricks to
build the classical visible world. For the aim of this ar-
ticle it is interesting to note the following implication: If
the parameter rest mass mo is defined with relation to
energy through E = moc
2, and one takes c as the upper
bound for signaling deriving from Implication II in Sec-
tion IX, then in the end “nonlocality at detection” leads
us to de Broglie’s matter-wave relations and relativity.
Nonetheless this unified picture does not invoke time-
ordered causality as “explanation of the correlations”;
here “Lorentz invariance” or “covariance” refers rather to
the fact that correlations between events are independent
of the observer’s inertial frame, and are not necessarily
tied to time-order [47].
XV. “OBSERVERS” AND “AGENTS”
Any science based on observations has necessarily to
define the observer who observes. For the science we
know and do, observation relates to the human observer.
It is a merit of QBism (“participatory realism”) to have
put the scientist (agent and observer) back into science
and stressing that “reality is more than any third-person
perspective can capture”.[49] The measurement problem
is tightly related to the role of the observer in quantum
physics. The “quantum of space-time” is defined by the
“minimal distance” two observed events can have. This
distance may be given by the Planck scale but for the
time being we ignore whether this is the case. To define
this “minimal distance” it is necessary to define sharply
what an observation is and when does it happen, that is,
to solve “the measurement problem”.
Furthermore one often overlooks that the observer
problem affects relativity as well: In special relativity,
one invokes the “grand-father” paradox to exclude sig-
nals traveling faster than light, that is, one argues that
such signals could be used to kill one’s grand-father and
this would be absurd. But why is this absurd? Actually
because we assume that an observation is something ir-
reversible and one cannot make it to be not happened:
Evidence about one’s grand-father existence cannot be
reversed to non-evidence. But special relativity doesn’t
tell us the conditions for this irreversibility to emerge,
and this means that also this theory has to struggle with
the “measurement problem”. In other words, to date
both quantum physics and relativity are incomplete.
Interestingly, the singularity problem is related to the
observer problem: At any black hole there is a “world’s
end” beyond which it does not make sense to speak of
observation; the “world’s end” is a hyper-surface defined
by either the “event-horizon” or the “death-horizon”, de-
pending on the size of the black hole.[51] Accordingly
there is no “real physical space-time” (there are no “cor-
related visible things”) in the region within the “world’s
end”, and then there is no “real physical” black hole sin-
gularity either.
Acknowledging the centrality of the observer in quan-
tum mechanics does not mean at all that a human experi-
menter has to be watching a detector in order this decides
to fire or not, but that at detection something happens
beyond the human operational capabilities to restore the
original state. If this is what the proposal “quantum
mechanics without observer” means, then welcome the
proposal. By contrast if it means that “observation” can
be defined without reference to the capabilities of the
human observer, the proposal becomes nonsensical: It
overlooks the obvious thing that the human senses are
the very foundation of experimental science.
The difficulty to acknowledge the centrality of the “hu-
man observer” in quantum mechanics (and more in gen-
eral in science) originates from an epistemological fallacy:
One assumes that all what exists does exist in space-time
(and therefore is accessible to the human senses), and on
the same time one postulates things in space-time that
are unaccessible to the human senses!
Consider for instance the predominance of matter over
antimatter (baryon asymmetry) in the universe we ob-
serve today. This imbalance between matter and anti
matter is a crucial condition to have stabile bodies and
therefore human observers. Baryon asymmetry is sup-
posed to originate from a reaction called “baryogene-
sis” at some time in the early universe after inflation
stopped. According to the Multiverse “hypothesis” at
this time two parallel universes resulted: the imbalanced
one we observe, and a second balanced one. It is obvi-
ous that a universe with (baryon symmetry) can never
be demonstrated on the basis of observations since hu-
man observers could not exist in such a universe. So, as
already argued in Section V, such a hypothetical alterna-
tive does not belong to our physical reality and can only
have the status of an idea existing outside space-time in
the “omniscient mind”. But this would lead us to an
absurdity: By creating space-time at the Big Bang this
mind apparently aimed to start a universe capable of be-
ing observed by humans, and some micro-seconds later
destroyed the very conditions making it possible that ob-
servers and observations happen.
This confirms the conclusions in Sections V and VI:
Any scientific description of the evolution of the universe
is necessarily an account of the emergence of human ob-
servers. In this sense one can say that physical reality
actually starts with the “arrival” of human observers.
Something similar happens with the role of “the
agent”: Quantum contextuality and nonlocality make
clear that the free will of the experimenter is a main
assumption of the theory, and has as a consequence the
“freedom on the part of nature”. But it is often over-
looked that the assumption of free-will is crucial in rela-
tivity too.[43]
In summary the Multiverse makes sense only in the
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form of All-Possible-Worlds, where the alternatives orig-
inate from all possible different free choices human agents
can do.
Thus Bohr and QBism are both right also regarding
the “observer” and “agent”: The measuring devices (de-
tectors) are excluded from a “subjective” quantum de-
scription when they are heavy enough and capable of ob-
taining an irreversible mark upon them (Bohr, [50] p.29).
However “irreversibility” does not mean “impossible to
reverse absolutely” but impossible to reverse by the hu-
man subject (observer and agent). Consequently, the
devices are not things separate and foreign to the agent:
What happens at detection in the detector is defined by
what happens in the human brain while observing; “the
agent and his devices are of one flesh.” ([50] pp. 29-30).
XVI. CONCLUSION
None more eloquently than David Deutsch has ex-
pressed that any deep statement about the nature of
physical reality includes a “we-perspective”:
“The universal quantum computer, in a sense contains
within itself all the diversity in nature. No other system
does, except perhaps systems that are capable of con-
structing a universal quantum computer. Certainly we
find ourselves unavoidably playing a role at the deepest
level of the structure of physical reality.” [13]
In my view one will hardly find a better way to bridging
Many-Worlds and Copenhagen, and lay the ground-work
for the All-Possible-Worlds picture.
The “hidden assumption” behind “Many-Worlds” is
that the physical reality is defined by “the free choices
human observers can in principle perform”. We play a
role at the deepest level of the structure of physical real-
ity.
This idea together with “Infuturabilien” leads to “All-
Possible-Worlds”, which is the coherent formulation of
“Many-Worlds”: All possible setting-choices humans of
all times can perform is a main ingredient of the con-
textual description of quantum. The other main ingredi-
ent is God’s contextual outcome assignments to all these
possible choices distributed according to “the normative
Born rule” (QBism).
The resulting quantum realm is a huge collection of
All-Conceivable-Histories, which includes the “universal
quantum computer” as a subsystem. Paraphrasing John
A. Wheeler: The entirety of quantum phenomena, rather
than being built on particles or fields of force or multi-
dimensional geometry, is built upon billions upon bil-
lions of elementary human decisions, “elementary acts of
observer-participancy” ([50] p.32, note 35).
Contextuality confirms the result of the experiment in
[21]: “Nonlocality at detection” rules the whole quantum
world. Longing for “deriving quantum from principles as
one derives relativity” may mean that we are overlooking
the deep physical meaning behind the Fourier transform:
“Local from nonlocal”.
The “laws of physics” actually arise from the maximal
number of experiments the humans of all times can in
principle perform: What is and is not possible is not
determined by physical “laws” but the other way around,
it is these “laws” which actually arise from what is and
is not possible.
But if the universe only starts with our observations,
is then the Big Bang here? To this question John A.
Wheeler answered once: “A lovely way to put it -‘Is the
big bang here?’ I can imagine that we will someday have
to answer your question with a ‘yes’.” ([49], p. 6, note
5). Without “human free choices”, no physical reality!
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